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But the real problem for the law is to reach some conclusions as to the im-
portance of the phenomenon and to devise standards which would protect the
economy against speculation which was genuinely "excessive" and harmful.
It may be that the position the law now takes is the height of wisdom:
somewhat to curb the ebullience of speculators without really making it im-
possible for them to carry out their function.' So happy a result, however,
would be a miracle of the legislative instinct responding empirically to prob-
lems as they emerge. One may hope that in his next edition, Professor Loss
would write a chapter of conclusions, dealing with this among other general
problems.
Professor Loss, however, is more directly concerned with the lawyers'
issues presented by statutory requirements of disclosure, prohibitions against
manipulation, trading on inside information, and like matters. These prob-
lems he examines with skill and insight, in the full setting of their historical
development, and of their comparative treatment in Canada, Great Britain,
and western Europe. In addition, he displays on almost every page, and even
in his footnotes, the gusto of a lawyer with a highly developed taste for the
human side of litigation. It would be churlish to ask for more.
EUGENE V. Rosvowt
MURDER, MADNESS AND THE LAw. By Louis H. Cohen. Cleveland: World
Publishing Co., 1952. Pp. 173. $3.50.
Tis is a book to be rent cover to cover. Its chief virtue is the relatively
slight number of pages. Yet in its small space more heinous murders are
committed and more horrid humans exhibited than in perhaps all the works
of Mickey Spillane or a year's subscription to True-Detective. The book was
executed by Louis H. Cohen (who is a psychiatrist) with the assistance of
Barbara Frank (who is the daughter of Judge Jerome Frank) and Thomas
E. Coffin (who is otherwise unidentified).
judge Frank's introduction starts the book off on the wrong foot by in-
sinuating it is a good book ("a new approach to the problem of the insane
murderer") and penning an adroit aphorism ("A society that punishes the
sick is not wholly civilized. A society that does not restrain the dangerous
madman lacks common sense.").' If Dr. Cohen had really gone on to reveal
to us how to separate the sick from the bad, the insane from the criminal, he
would have earned the gratitude of a society in fact deeply troubled over whom
to treat and whom to punish.
10. Thus Professor Loss, commenting on the effect of regulating short-selling under
§ 10(a) of the Exchange Act: "These rules [of the SEC] seem pretty well to have tal:en
the caffein out of the short sale." P. 682.
-Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
1. P. 9.
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"With 17 startling and dramatic case histories as the basis for his
investigation, Dr. Louis H. Cohen, well-known legal psychiatrist,
analyzes the problem of why people kill."
So states the dust-jacket. The modicum of truth is that the seventeen murders
are startling. The grossest exaggeration is that there is any analysis of why
people kill. We are told merely the awful rudiments of how seventeen insane
(or seemingly insane) people killed. The basic design of the book appears to
be the publication, for popular consumption, of seventeen shocking murders,
some infamous, the others not, all dressed in the vogueish psychiatric mode.
This reader was reminded of Benjamin Karpman's Alcoho'lic Women, pub-
lished as a psychoanalytic study of several promiscuous female imbibers, but
chiefly productive of a chronicle of the real and dream sex-lives of several
promiscuous female imbibers. The point is that such works, whatever their
rationale, seem designed less for any advancement of learning than for the
purveyance of shock and sex. This is not to suggest that such sensations are
not suitable objects of literature or learning, but to urge that the publication
of sensationalism be given its due and no more. Dr. Cohen, to be sure, tells
his sordid tales in the approved, coldly clinical manner. Nevertheless, seven-
teen insane melodramas emerge.
The somewhat obscure scholarly design of the book is probably as Judge
Frank suggests-to point out a new approach to the problem of the insane
murderer. We do not desire to punish the insane nor to treat the criminal,
so the psychiatrist will try to teach us to distinguish. Of the seventeen mur-
derers discussed by Dr. Cohen, nine were adjudged not insane while the re-
maining eight were found insane and committed to mental institutions. The
author appears to have little quarrel with the treatment of the latter eight at
the hands of the law. Concerning the nine found not insane, the author ex-
pressly criticizes only four convictions. Charles Guiteau, the assassinator of
President Garfield, was executed despite medical testimony of insanity. (It
may be noted, however, that fifteen medicos testified for the prosecution.)
Albert Fish, an old man, murdered and ate (with apparent sexual relish) a
ten year old girl. He was executed (following contradictory testimony of
psychiatrists for the prosecution and defense). "Harry," a good-looking youth,
killed "Lola," his first love, when Harry grew to believe Lola did not love
him. Harry was sentenced to life, following several years in a mental hospi-
tal, and despite testimony of schizophrenia by four psychiatrists. Finally,
"Lester," who lived with "Pearl" as man with wife, got blind drunk one night
and, suspicious of Pearl's sailor friends, shot Pearl. Despite the fact that Dr.
Cohen testified at trial that Lester's condition was one of (alcoholic) insanity,
Lester was convicted of first-degree murder. Dr. Cohen's opinion of Lester,
as contained in a report to defense counsel, is noteworthy:
"The nature of the prisoner's past history, particularly his delin-
quency and anti-social behavior dating from childhood, indicates to
me beyond any doubt that he is a psychopathic personality with
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amoral and anti-social traits. 'Moreover, lie has been a heavy alco-
holic, and for several months preceding the murder his drinking was
even heavier than usual. His behavior in the past would indicate
that under conditions of alcoholism his anti-social attitude would be-
come overtly manifested, and he would get into fights or uther dif-
ficulties of an anti-social kind, for which he already has six recorded
convictions by the authorities .. "
"From a diagnostic standpoint, the foregoing picture appears to
me to be that of a disorder considered by psychiatrists to be alcoholic
psychosis, pathological intoxication. If this is correct, the prisoner
at that time was incapable of understanding clearly or at all the dif-
ference between right and wrong, or to comprehend dearly the nature
and consequences of his acts."2
Notwithstanding Dr. Cohen's concluding sentence, the reader recalls:
"Suddenly Lester ran into one of the houses on the street. and told
the owner of the house that he had done something wrong. He asked
the man to call the police, and while he was waiting for the police, he
had three shots of whiskey."
'3
More seriously delinquent, however, are the author's reasons for describ-
ing Lester as psychopathic. As can be seen, these reasons center on Lester'.
anti-social and amoral behavior and traits. How ingenuous the psychiatrist.
By redefining criminal behavior in this sociologic way, a psychotic emerge,
where a chronic criminal earlier stood.
It may well be that Lester was insane. We certainly are not persuaded
by Dr. Cohen's kindly sophistry. Such, however, are the thoughts which
enter into the author's conception of insanity. For courts to use such a method
to distinguish the insane from the merely criminal would simply obliterate the
distinction.
Dr. Cohen's complete prescription fdr separating the mad from the bad
involves an initial determination (presumably by the court) of whether the
crime in question was an insane crime. The possibility of distinguishing insane
murders from ordinary murders was a subject of inquiry by Dr. Isaac Ray
in 1839, in his Medical Jurisprudcnce of Insanity. Dr. Cohen quotes Dr.
Ray's observations at considerable length. Some of the more important dis-
tinctions between insane and ordinary murder consist in the absence in the
former of any reasonable (selfish) motive, any well-conceived or executed
plans, and any accomplices. These common-sense observations are doubtless
generally valid and are, moreover, precisely the sort of reasons which today
persuade courts to order psychiatric examinations of certain criminals
brought before them. Like all rules of thumb, however, exceptions abound.
Were Leopold and Loeb not accomplices in their insane crime? Was there
a total absence of reasonable motive in their brazen attempt at confounding
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telligible motive in "Harry's" murder of "Lola," in "Lester's" killing of
"Pearl"? Literature surely affords many instances of such "insane" crimes.
Dr. Cohen somehow chooses to look only to two other of his cases for illus-
trations of the validity of his suggestions. Significantly, the courts in those
cases had anticipated the author and had found both the culprits to be of un-
sound mind.
Dr. Cohen's final appeal is for the more general use of psychiatrists in
criminal proceedings. The ideal is a psychiatric examination of every criminal
brought before the bar of justice. But aware of the unsightly phenomenon of
psychiatric "experts" contradicting each other in the court room, the author
proposes a court-appointed psychiatrist to determine insanity for the court.
This proposal has become popular with the avant-garde of the legal profes-
sion and has been recently adopted in modified form in certain New York
courts. The weakness should be obvious. Genuine disputes, however em-
barrassing, are not wisely resolved by eliminating one of the disputants.
Psychiatry is no science, as even Dr. Cohen will (elsewhere) admit. 4 The
only true protection against foolish or erroneous or malicious or arbitrary
expert opinions is the opportunity to cross-examine and provide expert
opinion in opposition. We have surely endured for too long legal trial by com-
bat to forego its undoubted virtues for the dubious calm and certainty of
monopolized expertise. The problem is not one of the courts but of the ex-
perts. Agreement is not wisely reached through elimination of all parties but
one.
The most troubling thought is why a book as superficial as this obtains
acclaim from jurists like Jerome Frank (and Edmund Cahn, as witnessed by
his review5 ). Perhaps even more serious is the question why such short-sighted
solutions for inevitable juristic problems like determination of disputed facts
(insanity, being one) are so readily embraced by presumably thoughtful ele-
ments of the bar and bench. Is it simply that our "realists" cannot realize the
unarticulated wisdom that may lie in legal traditions and social institutions?
Is it that they find in "archaic practices" their best whipping-posts for pre-
vailing trials and tribulations? Let old thought be abused where new thought
fails.
Why, for example, should the jurist listen to the psychiatrist castigate the
ancient (1843) McNaghten rule on criminal insanity? Why, when 'the psy-
chiatrist unblinkingly proposes, for locating criminal insanity, a new method
exclusively derived from the even more ancient writings (1839) of an Ameri-
can psychiatrist (Isaac Ray)? Why, especially, when the sanctity of legal
rules need not rest on science, whereas psychiatric rules deserve little regard
but as derivatives of a science?
If, then, there is a psychiatrist who can reveal a "test" of criminal respon-
sibility or sanity better than the McNaghten query whether the accused
4. P. 158.
5. Book Review, N.Y. Times, Nov. 30, 1952, § 7, p. 34, cols. 2-3.
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knew his deed was wrong, let him step forward. Pray let him think first,
however. Or, in the alternative, let him contemplate the other side to that
Platonic coin: "The best partner for dice-playing is not a just man, but a
good dice-player."
EDWARD DE GrLzi4t
WHITIHER EUROPE-UNION OR PARTNERSHIP? By M. J. Bonn. New York:
Philosophical Library, 1952. Pp. vii, 207. $3.75.
IN George Bernard Shaw's Joan of Arc, Joan comes to see Charles VII.
The English have occupied France, and Charles VII-a king who enjoys no
one's confidence-has taken refuge at Bourges. When Joan seeks out the
king, she brings nothing but her faith and her hope. She speaks and all
the world mocks her. Generals, bishops, jurists all call her a madwoman
until a young man, who is to become her companion in battle as well as in
victory, says, "Let us trust in madmen. Look where the wise have got us."
Perhaps Joan's companion was right. Perhaps the world should now be-
come a little mad, put aside "wisdom" and "reason," and believe that a
little hope, a little confidence, and a little faith are of more use than all pr,-
cedural wisdom. At least this reviewer felt this way before and even aftkr
reading Dr. Bonn's book.
The author, a distinguished economist and political scientist. deals real-
istically-and with many instructive parallels from the past-with the Euro-
pean Defense Treaty and other measures aimed at building western solidarity.
He advocates instead a system of multiple partnerships, joint institutions, and
limited working agreements. Viewing the whole problem in its historical
context, he argues strongly against the need for western union on a federal
pattern.
"Yet it is pretty clear that in the face of common danger-Nwhich
is not likely to recede for a long time to come-the Western
European countries must co-operate. They must pursue either an
identical or a joint foreign policy. But they must forge their own
instruments for this purpose; they cannot borrow from American
history. Could they today consult the Founding Fathers, those
great men would hardly advise them to imitate their work. They
would say: 'Face your problems, which are of a different order than
ours were, in the same spirit of inspired realism in which we taclded
ours and you will succeed. Create, do not copy.""
One wonders just how much Europeans need such a warning. When repre-
sentatives from our Congress met with those of the Consultative Assembly
-ilember, District of Columbia Bar.
1. P.69.
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